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ANIMALS HA VE NO RIGHTS AND ARE NOT THE EQUAL OF HUMANS 
by 
Joseph Margolis 
Peter Singer's thesis is uncomfortable. I for one am a meat eater-also, a fish 
eater, a shellfish eater, a chicken and turkey eater, even a pheasant eater-and I 
wouldn't care to be persuaded that I'm inhumane in so behaving, though I have 
no doubt that I could learn to behave better with regard to other creatures (and 
human beings, and have no wish to resist or avoid such instruction). I do 
believe that the point of Singer's argument is that, if one concedes his con­
clusion, then one's own conduct is on the line: we must, in any case, act 
(rationally) in accord with our beliefs. I find, however, that Singer's argument is, 
where compelling, trivial; and where not trivial, not compelling. 
Flrst of all, Singer has changed his position somewhat.1 The version for this 
Conference ("All Animals are Equal") is apparently intended not to be equiv­
alent to or to entail his earlier claims about animal rights-though, as in his 
citing, favorably, Bentham's view about extending rights to animals, and in other 
of his remarks, one might well be led to think that he had not (even provisional­
ly) abandoned the argument a�out animal rights. For the sake of scope-since 
Singer has supported animal rights, since others might, and since he might return 
to the argument-I should like to say some things about the theory of animal 
rights; but, for the sake of fairness-since Singer has put aside that claim and 
turned rather to hold that animals other than m�m are in some sense the moral 
equals of man-I should like to say some things about the theory of equality. 
The argument about the rights of animals pretty well comes down to this: 
Beings can only have rights proportionate to their capabilities, and this is 
all that the extension of the argument for equality to non-humans would 
imply. . . If we accepted the idea that non-human.c; have rights propor­
tionate to, their capabilities, and if we then resolved to withdraw our support 
from any practice which denied non-humans these rights, we would find that 
to carry out this resolution would, for a start, require a complete change in 
our diet.2 
When I first read Singer's papers, I must confess I thought it was all part of a 
serious joke (trying to find a striking way of urging human beings to be more 
humane to one another) or that it must be mad (trying to show that we cannot 
be moral, if rational, if we are not at the very least vegetarians, or, say, trying 
to show that it's impossible to "defend the idea that a human infant has a 
right to life which an adult pig does not have").3 But now I think it's simply 
right and wrong in parts, in the respects already suggested. 
One thing to consider is that, in the passage cited, Singer appears to believe 
that the thesis about equality itself implies that animals have rights "propor-
119 
2
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 5 [1974], No. 1, Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol5/iss1/5
ANIMALS HAVE NO RIGHTS AND ARE NOT THE EQUAL OF HUMANS 
tionate to their capabilities.". If so, then, contrary to his present intention, the 
doctrine of animal equality may not be independent of the doctrine about 
animal rights; and if that's so, then a defeat of the argument about animal 
rights would count as a defeat for, or a substantial blow to, the argument about 
animal equality. Secondly, it's difficult to be clear (from the various sources) 
whether Singer means that capabilities provide a necessary or sufficient con­
dition for the ascription of rights: the view that the condition is sufficient is 
preposterous, since we would not acknowledge that any creature had a right to 
do whatever accorded with his capabilities; . anq the view that the condition 
is merely necessary is, on the face of it, utterly inadequate as a basis for 
concluding that we must be vegetarians or anything else. 'Thirdly, CQnstruing 
the condition as a necessary condition for animal (or human) rights does not as 
yet say anything about whether any creature actually has rights; in fact, Singer 
nowhere shows that any creature does. The argument so far forth seems to be a 
conditional argument: if human beings have rights, then, on the . thesis of 
equality, non-human animals must have th�m as well. That we have yet to 
consider; but even if it were granted, we would lack a basis on which to argue 
that human and non-human animals were entitled to rights. 1'1nally, it may 
reasonably be maintained that human or. natural rights-pghts accorded to 
human beings merely because they are human beings-are entirely vacuous. 
Take for instance the right to life. No moral or related policy makes any 
sense at all except for living creatui:es; J!fe is a necessary condition for. the 
relevance of any policy at all . . On the other hand .. there is no determina� 
policy regarding the treatment of human b�ings that is incompatible with the 
putative right to life-for example, even in the practice of capital punishment, 
it will be argued (one way or another) that anyone executed has forfeited his 
civil or legal right to have his life preserved, that this does not bear at all on 
his natural or inalienable right to life. We have _the example of the French 
Revolution before us. The point is that so-called natural rights are all deter­
minable rather than determinate and all, as determinable, no more than the 
minimal conditions on which any alternative moral or related policies could be 
pursued . In that sense, their ascription is redundant and vacuous. Whatever else 
is interesting about rights is, I think, captured by the notion of equality. 
It seems, however, plausible to argue that hµ.man beings and human beings 
alone can make claims about their alleged rights and, since rights entail 
obligations (admitting the rights of A entails that B is obliged to respect /;(s 
rights), human beings alon� can acknowledge their obligations respecting others' 
rights, rights cannot extend to non-human animals. In this 5jense, animals cannot 
be the equal of human beings: the condition provided may be counted a 
necessary (not a suffici�nt) condition for the ascription of rights. It may well be 
that infants, fetuses, the senile, the menta11y defective lack these capacities; in 
that case, it's entirely consistent to deny that they actually do have tjghts­
which, of course, is not at all to say that it would not be right or wrong to treat 
them in one way or another. 'Rights' and (the adjective) 'right' function in 
decidedly different ways. Now, it's not necessary to show that this is the best 
theory of human rights; it's enough to show that it's a strong contender. 
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Dialectically, anyone (Singer, in the earlier articles at least) who holds that if 
human beings have rights, then, by equality, animals do as well, would have to 
show that the countermove was defective . Singer doesn't claim it is, and I my· 
self find it rather compelling. 
Tum, now, to equality. 
It looks as if Singer's central claim concerns the "right to equal consideration". 
In one of the earlier papers, Singer argues that· if "the principle of equal 
consideration of interests [is] a basic moral principle'', then "if a being has 
interests, they must be taken into account and considered equally with the like 
interests of any other being". 4 And, following Bentham, Singer regards "the 
capacity to suffer as the vital characteristic that gives a being the right to equal 
considerations . . .  or more strictly [the capacity] for suffering and/or enjoy­
ment or happiness"-since it makes possible the ascription of having interests. 5 
Reference to the right to equal consideration-which appears in the Conference 
paper-proves to be redundant (Singer admits this), since it comes to no more 
that our being rationally bound to be consistent with the principle of equality. 
The Conference paper and the earlier papers seem to be pretty well equivalent 
here (if �e drop reference to any substantive rights). 
But Singer equivocates on the concept of equality. There is a sense of 
equality,'. tantamount to the so-called principle of universalizability, in which 
"similar 'things must be similarly treated in similar respects". 6 'Ibis, obviously, 
is a principle of consistency-call it a logical or conceptual (or even, linguistic) 
principle: it is not a moral principle, though deliberate breaches of the principle 
(for advantage) are clearly immoral. If the capacity to suffer is a relevant moral 
consideration, then non-human animals capable of suffering are, in that regard, 
. the (moral) equals of men; they may, equally, be capable of suffering even if 
they are not capable of equal suffering. (Incidentally, this is a point not fully 
met by Singer, in his remarks about infants, the defective, and the like: human 
beings are, equally, human, though they may not be equal human beings, 
beings with equal endowments. This bears on his claim that there is no set of 
characteristics "which covers all humans [that] will . . . be possessed only by 
humans".) On the other hand, there is a sense of equality, which is a substantive 
moral sense, tantamount to what is sometimes called the principle of general­
izability, in which this or that attribute is claimed to be the relevant respect in 
which moral judgments are made (and. treated universalizably). That is, we 
generalize in holding that things are relevantly similar in this respect; and we 
universalize in holding that anything similar in this respect must be similarly 
judged. 
Now, Singer appears to conflate these two senses of equality . For, if he 
means to speak only in the sense of universalizability, then his argument is only 
conditional. If, say, the capacity to suffer is morally relevant, then, since ani­
mals are capable of suffering, they must be "equally" treated, in that regard, 
with humans. But how we ought to treat them cannot possibly follow from 
the admission of this argument; the argument itself concerns consistency, not 
moral commitments of any sort. This was the sense in which I said, at the very 
start, that where Singer was right, his thesis was trivial. No one could rationally 
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reject the principle of equality-fa the sense of universalizabiHty. So it's 
entirely neutral to whether we're mistreating animals in eating them and using 
them experimentally. On the other hand, even if the capacity to suffer is a 
relevant ,consideration for moral review, it can-on the basis of foregoing 
remarks-be no more than a consideration necessary to moral judgment. That 
is, we cannot neglect the suffering of any creature in arriving at a moral 
judgment or moral commitment; but what judgment or commitment we ought 
to make, all things considered., can't be decided merely from this consideration 
(or, from it alone, without some supporting argument). Sometimes, Singer 
seems to think that it is sufficient to enjoin us to be vegetarians. But I don't find 
the argument for that anywhere. So, treating equality in the sense of general­
izability, Singer must be wrong in drawing the conclusion that we must be 
vegetarians or must commit ourselves in any other particular way. All that's 
required is that our conduct be consistent with our judgments. Singer may have 
confused .questions about what's relevant to a moral judgment with questions 
about what are the. sufficient conditions for drawing particular moral judgments. 
There is one further, extremely interesting consideration to develop here, 
bearing on the seemingly paradoxical claim that egalitarianism and inegal­
itarianism are not, always, exclusive alternatives. If 'equality' is construed in 
terms of universalizabili ty, then consistent inegalitarianism must be defined in 
an "egalitarian" way. Simply put, if we wish to make moral judgments depend 
on differences of IQ (or race or sex), then all creatures. similarly endowed will be 
similarly treated and all others, not. Symptomatically, Singe,r has some trouble 
with this, .since he merely tries to advise opponents of racism, sexism, species­
ism how to avoid what appear to him to be forms of favoritism and prejudice. He 
cannot, in terms of universalizability, show that these alternative positions are 
indefensible; and he has not shown, in terms of generalizability and the need to 
provide sufficient conditions for moral judgment, that the position of the racist, 
sexist, or the like actually is untenable. All he's shown is that, perhaps, the 
capacity to suffer provides for the widest scope or moral judgment-an al­
together different matter from what's morally decisive in this or that context. 
In fact, the argument can be turned against Singer. He may be said-facetious­
ly-to be a clever "speciesist". (Insofar as they are capable of suffering, we may 
hold that animals are the moral equals of men (equally entitled to moral 
consideration); but since men are capable of doing all sorts of things impossible 
for animals and since these capacities are higher capacities than those of animals, 
wherever a conflict of interests involving such capacities arises (which may be 
practically always), we may, in good conscience, favor human policies over ani­
mal interests\ For instance, we may advocate the humane slaughter of beef 
animals but go on eating beef or, animal experimentation under responsible 
arrangements. Relevant facts may count against certain policies but it's dif­
ficult to see how-without some ulterior moral principle fleshed out with 
favored criteria (Singer's interpretation of utilitarianism, say)-they could force 
us to any such policy as vegetarianism. On the facetious reading of the argument, 
Singer may very well have traded the vegetarian concession (unnecessary in 
itself) for other values favoring the speciesist interests of human beings. How 
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could it be otherwise? In what conceivable sense could the interests of animals 
(supposing that we're really quite clear about these) count equally with the 
interests of humans-in the sense beariQg on what we choese to generalize 
over? There seems to be no way to make the case. In fact, coming full circle, 
it's pretty clear that the argument regarding equality (not in the sense of 
universalizability) is simply the analogue of the argument regarding rights. Ws 
hopeless to ascribe certain rights to animals (whether any rights are ascribed to 
animals) if they don't have human intelligence and interests; correspondingly, 
it's arbitrary to ascribe a certain substantive equality to animals (whether some 
equality of consideration follows from their ca�acity to suffer) if they don?t 
share typically human interests. 
I say again, then, that where Singer's argument is compelling, it's trivial; and 
where it's not trivial, it's not compelling. 
FOOTNOTES 
l .. Animal Llbcration", as far as I know, is the only piece that bas yet appeared in print-as 
a review of Animals, Men and Morals, ed. Stanley and RosUnd Godlovitch and John 
Harris (London: Taplin1er, 1973), In The New York Review of Boolu, 20. No. 5 (Apiil 5, 
1973), 17-21. This is plainly concerned wlth animal rights. I've also read two other papers 
of Sin1er:s, "The Riehts of Animals" and "Speciesism and Racism", that carry the same 
argument forward. In the review, Singer is persuaded that the argument "requires us to 
become ve1etarlans"; this seems to be the upshot of the other papers as well and of the 
paper ln. the Conference. 
2This ls from "Speclesism and Racism", which provides the most systematic a.rr;ument. 
3From "The Rients of Animals". 4From "Specieslsm and Racism". 
5Ibfd. 
6cf. R. M. Hare, The Lantuace of Moral& (Oxford ; Clarendon, 1952); also, Joseph 
Mar10Hs, Values and Conduct (Oxford : Clarendon, 1971). 
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